Steven Parmenius

                The empirical is a myth and, if I were an empiricist, I suppose I would say that is a bad thing (the myth being concerned, as Aristotle says, with the most abstract and general). It isn’t, however, a bad thing at all. It is just a thing. This myth is a powerful representation of what is means to know. It is an image of knowing and images of knowing can be good or bad depending on their application. Certainly, the myth of the empirical can lead us down some very unproductive paths. It has emancipatory potential too even on a direct social level. The myth of the empirical is, like other powerful myths, complex and multifaceted. The myth of the empirical is, for one thing, a democratic myth. All persons qua persons possess the basic capacity for observation. At the same time ‘the empirical’ is a possession of the cadre of specialists we call scientists. The empirical is directly to hand for all to see and at the same time the product of the most refined, specialized even

                   What, in the 21 st century, stands as a public reason in North American societies? This is a harder question than many assume for our notion of what constitutes public reason is currently in flux. A reason is public if it stands as a legitimate ground of explicit or implicit social coercion. A reason is public when it is of such authority and objectivity that persons can legally be compelled to recognize it. This is explicit in relation to vaccines and public heath measures or in the certification of various kinds of professionals. Coercion is implicit in terms of pressure applied not by governments but by the broader society as in Facebook shaming or cancelling of speakers. It can also be implicit in the writing of curricula for schools for children need to be taught something and bureaucrats and administrators determine what this something is. Nor can the diverse wishes of citizens and parents be perfectly accommodated by these determinations. One parent will be